Survival of Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators by Evans, Alvin E.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 19 | Issue 3 Article 1
1931
Survival of Claims For and Against Executors and
Administrators
Alvin E. Evans
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evans, Alvin E. (1931) "Survival of Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 19 : Iss. 3 ,
Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol19/iss3/1
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Volume XIX MIARCH, 1931 Number 3.
SURVIVAL OF CLAIMS FOR AND AGAINST
EXECUTORS AN[Y ADMINISTRATORS
The unfortunate condition of our law regarding the sur-
vival of claims both against and in favor of the personal repre-
sentative has been frequently remarked upon.' It is arguable
that a policy which would support a general survival of claims
in favor of a personal representative would not exist where the
situation is reversed, and the wrongdoer has died in the lifetime
of the claimant. The action of trespass was related to criminal
appeals, and since a man cannot be punished in his grave, this
action did not survive under the common law. To the extent
then, that a recovery is vindictive, the maxim that personal
actions die with the person might be held to support a desirable
policy. It may be argued that if the claimant cannot enjoy the
recovery in sua persona propria, there should be no vicarious
enjoyment of the proceeds of a recovery, yet it is believed that
our modern concept of the proprieties tends to regard vicarious
enjoyment as a reasonable substitute for personal enjoyment.
If the wrongdoer has died, it can scarcely be called a penalty
upon his legatees and distributees to take from them what would
otherwise be a windfall. As between the injured plaintiff and
them, the former may well have the greater equity.
While much has been written upon the subject of survival,
and changes from the common law rule have occurred, still it
seems worth while to study the American and English decisions
as a background for the further study of American statutes on
survival. This paper was originally intended to be a discussion
of the cases where the wrongdoer was dead. That is to say,
interest was directed toward the problem of the obligations of
'See especially Pollock on Torts (12th ed. 1923), pp. 66-72. Cf.
Salmond on Jurisprudence (7th ed. 1924), pp. 434-5; Winfield, "Death
as Affecting Liability for Tort," 29 Col. L. Rev. 239 (1929).
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the representative rather than toward the assets of the estate.
It is impossible, however, to deal with this type of obligations
without also dealing with this type of assets, although writers
of treatises and casebooks may find it necessary to continue to
examine them separately as a matter of classification.
This discussion then, deals with the following classes of
cases:
I. CoNTRAcTs.
1. Those contracts involving ordinary business transactions
breached before death. This problem is quite different from
the question whether death relieves the parties from further
obligations where no breach prior to death has occurred.'
2. Obligations arising from judgments including decrees for ali-
mony where the alimony is in arrears.
3. Implied promises such as the promise of a physician and of an
attorney to use due skill; of a seller that the article sold is
wholesome; of an employer that the place of labor is safe and
the tools are not defective; of a carrier to carry safely, etc.
4. Breach of promise of marriage contracts.
5. Quasi-contractual obligations arising generally from unjust
enrichment where the gravamen of the complaint is grounded
in fact in tort, but, as it is said, the complainant may waive
the tort and sue in contract.
II. ToRTs.
1. Claims that fall under the old classification of trespass and
case involving injury to property direct and Indirect. These
claims died with the person at common law, but were made to
survive under the Statute of 4 Edward III (1330) and the equi-
table interpretation of it. There were also the additional
statutes of 1357 and 1833 and others of minor importance.
2. (a) Trespasses to the person (intended and unintended but
negligent injuries) which are frequently accompanied with
(b) Incidental pecuniary loss.
3. Injuries to the person, not amounting to physical injuries,
such as slander and libel, criminal conversation, malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment, which violate the more
intangible interests of personality.
4. Claims arising as a consequence of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion, where there has been a pecuniary loss to the claimant
but no injury to specific property, and where an action in
indebitatus assumpsit will not lie.
I. CONTRACTS.
1. In the ordinary case the contract action survived.
Therefore the maxim regarding actio personalis was given a
special meaning and applied only to choses of a tortious origin.
It would accordingly seem that the rule of non-assignability of
choses could not have had great influence in the development
and interpretation of the maxim. Contract claims survived long
'These latter cases are more fully presented in an article in 7 New
York Law Quarterly Review 17 (1929) entitled "The Contrattual
Obligations of Personal Representatives."
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before the statute gave a remedy in trespass to the executor and
long before assignability of contract rights came to be recog-
nized.
S6 actions of covenant and of assumpsit survived.
4 Yet
some did not survive. It seems strange that one who has ad-
vanced money for the instruction of his son in a trade, cannot
recover it back if the master died without giving the instruction,
but such was the English rule.5 Williston suggests that the
ground for the holding is perhaps that the payment by the father
was not strictly for the instruction, but was paid in exchange for
the chance of instruction; but he does not regard this theory as
tenable in fact.6 The court urged that the premium was not
apportionable, and that his executor continued liable for main-
tenance, and it cannot be known how much the master would
have lost if the apprentice had died.
So also there run in favor of a representative, implied pro-
mises of a life tenant to make repairs;7 claims for rent in
arrears," and contracts to renew leases. 9 In many such cases
the issue of survivability may in fact not be raised since the
question whether performance by or in favor of the personal
representative is excused by death may be the issue. The dis-
tinction between survival of contract obligations where the con-
tract was breached and the excusing of performance because of
death, should always be borne in mind.
2. Judgments; Arrears of Alimony.
Obligations survived both in favor of and against represen-
tatives based on a judgment,' 0 classified by Blackstone as con-
'See 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1923), p. 576-85.
'Raymond v. Fitch, 2 Crampton, Meeson & Roscoe 588 (Exch. 1835)
(not to fell trees); Hamilton v. Wilson, 4 Johns. 72 (N. Y. 1809)
(covenants of selsin not running with the land). Farrow v. Wilson,
L. R. 4 C. P. 744 (1869); Hall v. Wright, El. B. & El. 765 (994 Ex. Ch.
1869), and Siboni v. Kirkman, 1 M. & W. 418 (Exch. 1836), illustrate
contracts regarded as personal which were breached by death and so
the personal representative was excused. These cases accordingly do
not raise the survival issue where a contract is breached otherwise
than by death.
"'9lhncup v. Hughes, L. R. 6 C. P. 78 (1871), (1385); Ferns v.
Carr, 2S Ch. D. 409 (1885) (overruling the earlier case of Hirst v. Tol-
son, 2 Mac. & G. 134) (Ch. 1850).
6 See 2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 838, n. 25.
'Prescott v. Grimes, 143 Ky. 191 (1911).
*Polgrave v. Windham, 1 Strange 212 (K. B. 1722); Harris v.
Vi kers. 1 Harr. 6 (Del. 1832).
'Hyde v. Skinner, 2 P. Wins. 196 (Ch. 1723).
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tracts of record. 1 But at common law final judgment (in
causes that do not otherwise survive) must have been rendered.
So in the case of an interlocutory judgment quod computet, or
a judgment quod recuperet, if the defendant died before the writ
of inquiry as to the amount of damages had issued, the actio
personalis maxim applied.12 Also where there is an appeal from
a judgment in an action for assault and battery, and pending
the appeal the defendant dies, there is no survival. 13 So too, if
an election contestee dies pending an appeal, the appeal abates.' 4
Some changes have been made by statutes in various states. 5
Claims for arrears of alimony do not abate on the death of either
party.' 6 In Brydges v. Brydges 17 damages had been assessed
against a corespondent in a divorce action and he was ordered
to pay the sum awarded into court within one month. He died
within the month. It was held that the executor was not liable
for the sum, since the court had no jurisdiction save over parties
over whom it was given by statute, and it was not given over
executors merely because the court order would be otherwise
ineffectual. It is said that such a claim is personal in the sense
that it is neither assignable nor subject to garnishment or other
lien, and cannot be diverted to any purpose other than that of
the maintenance of the claimant, but is personal in no other
sense.' s
"Berwickc v. Andrews, 1 Salk. 314 (K. B. 1695); Flint v. Gilpin,
29 W. Va. 740, 3 S. E. 33 (1887). But Cf. cases in xlix I Anders 23
(C. P. 1534).
II Blackstone's Commentaries 465.
Smith v. Haskins, 2 Atk. 385 (Ch. 1742).
Shields v. Rowland, 151 Ky. 136 (1912).
1AGalvin v. Shafer, 130 Ky. 563, 113 S. W. 485 (1908).
"See for example South Dakota Compiled Laws (1929), sec. 2565;
judgment may be entered where defendant dies before judgment but
after verdict. But under the United States statutes, in order that final
judgment may be entered after death of either party, the action must
be one that survives. See Rev. St. U. S., see. 965 (Comp. St., sec. 1592).
For a general discussion of survival where death may occur at various
stages of the trial see 49 L. R. A. 153, 161, 165.
"Dinet v. Eigenmann, 80 Ill. 274 (1875); Gerrein v. Mitchie, 122
Ky. 250 (1906); In re Brace's Estate, 105 Misc. 178, 173 N. Y. S. 636
(1918); Haussaurec v. Markbreit, 68 Oh. St. 554, 67 N. E. 1066 (1903);
Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass. 353 (1883); Martin v. Thison, 153 Mich. 516,
116 N. W. 1013 (1908); Mc17roV v. Mclroy, 208 Mass. 458 (1911); In
re Stillwell, 1 Ch. 365 (1916); Vanness v. Ransom, 215 N. Y. 557, 109
N. E. 593 (1915); Coffman v. Finney, 65 Oh. St. 61 (1901). Cf. 33 Har.
L. Rev. 556, 570, notes 76, 77 (1920).
(1909) P. D. 187.
"Cf. 29 Har. L. Rev. 100 (1916).
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3. Implied Promises to Use Skill; Implied Warranties.
The only reason why the breach of the implied promise of a
physician to exercise skill did not survive against his executor,
seems to be that the gravamen of the action is a tort, and tort
actions for injury to the person did not survive.
19 Conse-
quently, these cases were regarded the same as trespass to the
person where no contract was involved at all. In many jurisdic-
tions there can be no recovery for incidental pecuniary losses
such as for physicians' and hospital expenses, loss of services,
time and the like.20 It is believed that the contracts of an attor-
ney to use skill should fall under a different category. Here the
injury is generally not to the physical person, but is pecuniary.
There is no sufficient reason why such contract actions should
not survive the same as those of other business transactions, and
they did survive in most jurisdictions. These contracts should
not be classed with those of physicians, the only common element
being the failure to use due skill.21 If the latter cases must be
treated as torts, then the Statute of 4 Edward III and of 3 and 4
William IV do not afford relief even under a liberal construc-
tion.
Undoubtedly in many cases the contract of a common car-
rier to carry safely; the obligation of an innkeeper to keep his
guests' goods safely, and his premises in a safe condition, the
injury may affect the person; and the same might be true of
2'Jenkins v. French, 58 N. H. 532 (1879). In Long v. Morrison,
14 Ind. 595 (1860), it is intimated that where the husband employs a
physician to perform services for his wife and the latter is injured by
the malpractice of the physician, there is a breach of contract and the
action would at common law survive the death of the wife. In two
subsequent cases, Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159 (1874), and Burns v.
Barrenfield, 84 Ind. 43 (1882), it is intimated that a recovery may be
had in contract for malpractice of a physician. No question of sur-
vivability was present. In the subsequent case, Boor v. Lowrey, 103
Ind. 468, 3 N. E. 151 (1885), it is declared, however, that if a recovery
was had in the two prior cases in contract, for personal injuries the
result was wrong and the cases overruled. No reference was made to
the earlier case, but it seems overruled sub silentio, at least to the
extent that It holds that an action against a physician for injury to
the wife is a contract action and that recovery may be had for per-
sonal injuries after the death of the wife. See also Vittum v. Gilman,
48 N. H. 416 (1869), and Wolf v. Wal, 40 Oh. St. 111 (1883) (mal-
practice).
-"Cf. 13 Cornell Law Quarterly (1928), 596, 599.
21 Knights v. Quarles, 2 B. & B. 102 (C. P. 1820); In Scott v. Brown,
24 Hun 620 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1888), an action against a plumber was
allowed to survive his death for incidental losses arising from mal-
performance but none for the physical injuries.
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obligations of a landlord to repair, of a telegraph company to
deliver telegrams promptly, as also may be the express or implied
warranties of wholesomeness. 22  But it may quite as well be also
that the injury in any and all of these cases is largely pecuniary
rather than personal, and they would thus more resemble the
implied promise of an attorney to exercise due skill. In a good
many cases of the latter type, fraud also is an element. In a
number of jurisdictions recoveries in such cases are permitted 2a
for expenses for medical care and for loss of time and injury to
business, though not for the purely personal injuries such as
pain and suffering. They hold these losses are recoverable in
contract though they are incidents of a tort. There are, however,
many dicta to the effect that such damages are incidental to the
personal injury and not recoverable.
24
4. Breach of Marriage Promise.
Causes of action for breach of promise do not survive in the
absence of special damage. 25 Expenses accruing in preparation
for the wedding, giving up one's business or position, and seduc-
tion and the birth of a child in reliance on the promise, are con-
sidered as merely incidental and not special damages. It seems
reasonably clear here that the injury is comparable to those
injuries to property for which trespass on the case afforded the
appropriate remedy. An action was maintainable in contract
inter vivos but after the death of one of the parties a contract
action was not maintainable. Whether such causes of actions
should survive will depend somewhat at least on the attitude the
critic takes regarding similar actions inter vivos. Socially, sur-
vival here may well be undesirable.
1 Cf. Cornell Law Quar. 1. c. note 20 and cases cited.
"Bradshaw v. Lancashire Ry. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 189 (1875); Leg-
gott v. Great Northern Ry., 1 Q. B. D. 599 (1876); Kelley v. U. P. Ry.
Co., 16 Col. 455 (1891); Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143 (1870) (sale
of laudunum instead of rhubarb); Mageau v. G. N. Ry. Do., 103 Minn.
290, 115 N. W. 651 (1908) (contract f6r carrying safely).
See 13 Cornell L. Q. 596, 599 (1928).
Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 Maule & Selwyn, 408 (K. B. 1814);
Quirk v. Thomas, (1916) 1 K. B. 516; Finlay v. Chirney, 20 Q. B. D.
494 (1888); Hovey v. Page, 55 Me. 142 (1867); Stebbins v. Palmer, 1
Pick. 71 (1822) ; ./ ade v. 1 albfleis(h, 58 N. Y. 282, 17 A. R. 230 (1874) :
Chase v. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359, 364 (1882); Lattimore v. Simmons, 13
Serg. & R. (Pa. 1825) 183; Grubb's Administrator v. Sult, 32 Grat.
(Va.) 203, 84 Am. Rep. 765 (1879); Warner v. Benham, 126 Wash.
393, 218 Pac. 260, 34 A. L. R. 1358 (1923); Flint v. Gilpin, 29 W. Va.
740, 3 S. E. 33 (1887).
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5. Quasi-Contractual Obligations.
The abritrary character of the classification of actiones per-
sonales with the consequence that contract actions did but tort
actions did not survive, was shown in the classical case Hambly
v. Trott.26 There an action was brought in trover by the execu-
tor for the conversion of chattels of the testator. The Lord
Chief Justice (Mlansfield) indicated that claims must be con-
sidered first as to cause, and second as to form. He declared
that there could be no recovery in trover in this case, but that
plaintiff might sue the representative in contract by waiving the
tort.
27
Some jurisdictions still hold to the doctrine of the theory of
the pleadings even under modern code provisions, and insist that
if the action is grounded in trover plaintiff cannot recover, al-
though he may have proved facts which would have sustained a
count in indebitatus assumpsit.
28
Suppose a man and woman purport to enter the marriage
relation with each other, but due to some disqualification of the
one or the other, and known to that one but fraudulently con-
cealed, an action for damages for deceit arises. While the tort
" Cowp. 371 (K. B. 1776); see Fox v. Hale, 108 Cal. 478, 41 P. 328
(1895).
17 See Powell v. Rees, 7 A. & E. 426 (K. B. 1837) (coal tortiously
mined); also Wynn v. Tallapoosa Bank, 168 Ala. 469, 53 So. 228 (1910)
(tort without benefit to defendant's intestate); Alexander v. Dean, 157
Ga. 2,';0, 121 S. E. 238 (1924) (trover and assumpsit, and action does
not survive). Before statute of 4 Edward III caused trespass d. b. a.
to survive in favor of executors, detinue and replevin would lie in
many cases. Cf. Sherrington's Case, Saville 40 (C. P. 24 Eliz. 1582);
Pinchon's Case, 9 Coke 86-b (K. B. 1612); LeMason v. Dixon, W. Jones
173 (K. B. 1628); Denny v. Booker, 2 Bibb. 427 (5 Ky. 1811) (detinue);
Clapp v. Walters, 2 Tex. 130 (1847) (detinue); Allen v. Harlan, 6 Leigh
42 (Va. 1835) (detinue); Catlett v. Russell, 6 Leigh 344 (Va. 1835)
(detinue); Viner's Abridgment Det. D. pl. 1. Cf. also Walter v. Miller,
1 lIar. 7 (Del. 1832) (trover for slaves); Batty v. Greene, 206 Mass. 561
(1910) (obtaining property by pretended marriage); Newsum v. New-
8um, 1 Leigh 86 (Va. 1829) (trover for slaves); Winchester v. Knight,
1 P. Wins. 406 (Ch. 1717) (bill for an account against executor for ore
sold by a tenant in his lifetime). In Wisconsin an action in ejectment
abates with the death of defendant and with it goes the incidental
claim for mesne profits and the counterclaim for improvements. See
Farrall v. Shea, 66 Wis. 561, 29 N. W. 634 (1886). For assumpsit for
mesne profits see Pulteney v. Warren, 6 Ves. 73 (Ch. 1801); Gardiner
v. Fell, 1 Joc. & W. 22 (Ch. 1819).
•"Alexander v. Dean, supra n. 27; State v. Blake, 107 Wash. 294,
181 Pac. 685 (1919). But cf. better view taken under similar circum-
stances, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 477 (1919); Raymond v. Bailey, 98 Conn.
201, 118 Atl. 915 (1922); Tichenor v. Hayes, 41 N. J. L. 193 (1879). In
the two latter jurisdictions the tort action also survives.
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action does not survive,29 a good many jurisdictions permit the
spouse (if it be the wife) to recover in quasi-contract for the
value of services rendered.30
II. TORTS.
1. Trespass, Case and Trover.
The Statutes of 4 Edward III and 3 and 4 William IV
caused certain tort actions to survive. The first Statute pro-
vided for the survival of trespass actions d. b. a. in favor only of
the executor. It was given an equitable construction so that it
included case, 31 or actions for indirect injury to specific prop-
erty, and sometimes it included actions for fraud and deceit.82
Actions in trover survived in favor of the representative under
this equitable construction,3 3 but not against the representa-
tive,3 4 because the first named statute was passed in the interest
of the representative only.
In Tucke's case3 5 it was declared that if the executor com-
mits a devastavit and dies, his executor is not liable for the waste
because a personal action dies with the person. Nearly a cen-
tury later the Lord Chancellor said: "Although by common law
when an executor wastes, his executor shall not be liable because
it is a personal wrong, yet it is otherwise here; and the common
law will come to it at last," and it was so decreed. 6 The com-
"Price v Price, 75 N. Y. 244 (1878); contra under the Statute of
Maine, Wither v. Brooks, 65 Me. 14 (1875)."See Evans, Property Interests Arising from Quasi-Marital Rela-
tions, 9 Cornell L. Quar. 246 (1924); 41 Ear. L. Rev. 400 (1927).
3Emerson v. Emerson 1 Vent. 187 (K. B. 1672); Smith v. Colgay
Cro., Eliz. 377 (K. B. 1590); Pinchon's Case, 9 Co. 86 B. (9 Jam. I K.
B.); Nettles v. D'Oyley, 2 Brevard 27 (S. C. 1806). See 1 Williams on
Executors, 608-9.
2Twycross v. Grant, 4 C. P. D. 40 (1878) (fraudulent prospectus).
Cf. Haight v. Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464 (1859) (fraudulent representation as
to incumbrance); Gokter v. Crozier, 5 Ala. 369 (1843) (fraud in the
exchange of horses); Graves v. Spier, 58 Barb. 340 (1870) (fraud In
the purchase and sale of real estate); Brackett v. Griswold, 103 N. Y.
425, 9 N. E. 438 (1886) (court says that a count alleging the organiza-
tion of a company for the purpose of defrauding decedent and the
public whereby decedent suffered loss, survives; but the cause arising
under a penal statute for a false report as to the amount of capital
stock paid in does not survive).
"Russell's Case, 5 Co. 27a (1565 K. B.); Rutland v. Rutland, Cro.
Eliz. 377 (K. B. 1590); 1 Williams on Executors 609.
"Hambley v. Trott, supra n. 26; Bailey v. Birtles, T. Raymond 71
(K. B. 15 Car. II 1664); Sherrington's Case, supra n. 27.
"3 Leon. 241 (K. B. 1590) Wins. 1340.
3 Price v. Morgan, 2 Ch. Cas. 215 (1676).
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mon law courts never came to it until 1833 when the statute of
that year provided for the survival of actions for injuries to real
and personal property in favor of as well as against the personal
representative. 37 This case suggests that perhaps chancery
might have found a way out of the difficulty regarding survival,
at least in a limited type of cases
38
The actions made to survive against the representative by
the Statute of 3 and 4 William IV provided a remedy for tres-
passes to realty, as well as to personalty, if the trespass was
committed within six months of the death of deceased. So
where coal had been tortiously taken from plaintiff's lands, some
of it more than and some of it within six months of the death of
the wrongdoer, it was held that indebtitatus assumpsit would lie
for that first taken and trespass for that last taken.3 9 Hambly
v. Trott40 antedates the statute making trespasses to real and
personal property survive against as well as in favor of personal
representatives.
Prior to the Statute of 3 and 4 William IV actions in trover
did not survive41 against the representative, but as already indi-
cated, if suit in inde7bitatus assumpsit would lie, the action
might survive in contract form. Actions for statutory penalties
did not survive 42 even under the statute. It appears that the
English courts never under these statutes allowed a claim for
unliquidated damages for misrepresentation to survive.
43
2. Personal Injuries, Trespass.
Personal injuries may consist (a) in actual injuries to the
physical person causing pain and suffering, the remedy for
which at common law was the action of trespass; and (b) may
give rise to incidental losses such as obligations for physicians
and hospital services, the loss of time and compensation, and the
See Reppy & Tompkins, History of Wills, page 305 (1928).
u Of. Winchester v. Knight, supra n. 27, where a bill for an account-
ing was decreed against a representative.
"Powefl v. Rees, 7 A. & E. 426 (K. B. 1837). North Carolina had
a similar statute without the six months limitation, as early as 1799.
Cf. Ten Eyck v. Runk7, 31 N. J. L. 42S (1866). (The New Jersey
Statute was passed in 1855.)
"Supra n. 26.
"See Reppy and Tompkins History of Wills, page 316 (1927).
S Story v. Sheard (1892), 2 Q. B. 515; Shepheard v. Bray (1906),
2 Ch. 235.
"Williams on Executors, p. 609, note (u).
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payment for services of a substitute; and (c) may consist of
such injuries as cause anxiety, indignation or mental anguish
without immediate injury to the physical person, i. e., that is to
say injuries to the more intangible interests of personality which
affect the feelings, dignity and character of the injured person.
These claims were not made to survive under the Statutes of 4
Edward III and 3 and 4 William IV.
It is generally held in the absence of an appropriate statute
that for item (a) there is no recovery where either claimant or
wrongdoer has died.44 In cases where both person and property
are injured by the same act, recovery is allowed for the injury to
the property only.45 In New York the statutes provide for sur-
vival of "actions for all wrongs done to the property rights and
interests of another."" But "interests of another" do not
include personal injuries and presumably the Statute refers to
pecuniary interests only,47 and it makes no difference whether
the personal injury arises from a breach of contract or from a
tort. As such actions did not survive against the representative,
so they did not survive in his favor.48
Even though no recovery was allowed under (a), a recovery
might still be allowed under (b) for the pecuniary loss, but
unless such loss was from a tort arising out of a contract there
was no recovery, 49 and many cases held there was no recovery
even then. 50
Suppose causes of action for personal injuries survive by
statute but the injury ultimately results in death and an action
"Pulling v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 110 (1882); Cihi-
chester v. Union Transfer Co., 1 McArthur 295 (D. C. 1874); HiZliker
v. Citizens St. By., 152 Ind. 86 (1899); sawyer v. Concord R. R. Go..
58 N. H. 517 (1879); Brown v. Wrightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366
(1915).
41 See cases cited in 13 Cornell L. Quar., 596, 600, n. 31.
"N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (1909), c. 18, secs. 116 and 120. This
includes an action for the false return of a sheriff under the statute
as amended in 1830, sec. 158.
'Bernstein v. Jockey Club, 222 App. Div. 191, 225 N. Y. S. 449
(1927).
"Jenkins v. French, 58 N. H. 532 (1879) (malpractice of physi-
cian); Hadley v. Brayers, 58 Ala. 185 (1877) (assault and battery);
Hilliker v. Citizens St. By., 152 Ind. 86 (1899) (negligent injury by
common carrier).
4" Puling v. Great Eastern By. Co., supra n. 44; Sawyer v. Concord
R. B. Co., supra n. 44. But see Hegerlch v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 269 (1885),
and dictum in Eden v. Lexington B. R. Co., 14 B. Mon. 165 (53 Ky.
1853). I
'0 Cf. note 45 supra.
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is brought under some replica of Lord Campbell's Act, may there
be a recovery in both cases7 In the first place, a statutory pro-
vision that actions for "wrong to the person shall survive" does
not apply to wrongs resulting in death, and there must be a
specific provision in the wrongful death statute providing for
survival of the cause both for and against the representative in
order that such may be the result.5 1
Assuming that the action for personal injuries survives by
statute, and there is also a suitable provision for survival of the
action for wrongful death against the representative of the
wrongdoer, may the representative of the decedent prosecute
both actions? This problem has been ably discussed by Bowen
E. Schumacher. 52 He shows that by the weight of authority in
this country, a judgment or a settlement or release by the
decedent with the wrongdoer bars the action by the representa-
tive. It appears that the two causes are entirely distinct and
that the reasoning of the courts upon which the result is based
is unsound. Mr. Schumacher compares the conclusions of the
Federal Courts under the Federal Employers Liability Act and
finds that they are essentially in conflict with the view that
there should be only one recovery. The grounds for the con-
fusion are well set forth. The result is in substance that thouzh
under an appropriate statute the action for personal injuries
is made to survive the death of either party, still if there is also
an action brought for damages for wrongful death, the statute
is ineffective as to the personal injuries.
3. Injuries to the More Intangible Interest of Personality.
Causes of action arising for personal injuries to the feelings
and to reputation never survive apart from some statute.53
a'Davis v. Nichols, 54 Ark. 358 (1891); Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal.
627, 150 P. 357 (1915), 4 Cal. L. R. 52 (1916); Green v. Thompson, 26
Minn. 500, 5 N. W. 376 (1880); Hegerich v. Keddle, supra n. 49; Rus-
sell v. Sunbury, 37 Oh. St. 372, 41 A. R. 523 (1881); Moe v. Smiley, 125
Pa. 136, 17 A. 228, 3 L. R. A. 341 (1889); Johnson v. Farmer, 89 Tex.
610, 35 S. W. 1062 (1896); Rinker v. Hurd, 69 Wash. 257, 124 Pac. 687
(1912).
" Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 Mich. L.
Rev. 114 (1925), and see cases cited; 9 N. Carolina Law Rev. 101
(1930).
H arker v. Clark, 57 Cal. 245 (1881) (false imprisonment);
Francis v. Burnett, 84 Ky. 23 (1886) (malicious prosecution); Johnson
v. Haldeman, 102 Ky. 163 (1897) (libel); Nettleton v. Dinehart, 5 Cush.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
There seems to be a general idea that such causes should not
survive, b.ased perhaps upon the notion that a judgment here is
in the nature of a penalty rather than compensatory. This
ground may be regarded by the critic as sufficient to warrant the
exception, and if any exception should be made to a general sur-
vival statute, along with breaches of promise of marriage, these
cases seem to be the most worthy of exception.
An interesting question has arisen whether or not an action
may be maintained against the executor for damages for libelous
matter contained in a will and probated by the executor. When
such a case arose in Pennsylvania, it was held that such an
action would lie, though no precedent could be found therefor.5"
This view was also subsequently taken by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. 55 There is properly here no question of survival,
since no cause of action arose against the testator in his lifetime.
It is clearly a case which calls for a remedy, and the result is
desirable; but the court may be regarded here as making as well
as finding the law for a new kind of wrong. A number of cases
have arisen in England where a motion has been made either to
strike libelous or objectionable matter from the will, or to omit
it from probate. No general principle has been worked out. In
several cases the motion has been overruled, 56 but in several
cases the motion to omit such matter from the probated copy
was sustained.
5 7
4. Fraud, Misrepresentation and Conspiracy.
Tort actions did not survive at common law, but if property
were acquired by the wrongdoer as distinguished from merely
deriving a benefit, indebitatus assumpsit would lie either for or
543 (1850) (malicious prosecution); Noonan v. Orton, 34 Wis. 259, 17
A. R. 441 (1874) (malicious prosecution); People v. Tioga Com. Pleas,
19 Wend. 73 (1837) (seduction of servant). But see Huggins v. Toler,
1 Bush 192 (1866) (abuse of process).
See Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733 (1901).
"Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 49
L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, Ann. Cas. 1914-C, 885 (1914).
1urtis v. Curtis, 3 Add. 33 (Ecc. 1825); Goods of Honywood,
L. R. 2 P. & D. 251 (1871); In re Meyer's Will, 72 Misc. Rep. 566, 131
N. Y. S. 27 (1911).
"Goods of Warnably, 1 Rob. Ecc. 423 (1846); Marsh v. Marsh, 1
Sw. & Tr. 528 (Ece. 1860); Gallagher's Estate, supra n. 54; Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Howell, 32 N. J. Eq. 146 (1880); see 62 Univ.
of Pa. L. Rbv. 643 (1913); 3 Redfield on Wills 53 (3rd ed. 1876).
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against the representative. Two successive statutes provided
for survival of actions where the injury was to specific property.
For personal injuries there was no recovery. What is to be said
about those torts where there has been a pecuniary loss to claim-
ant (though unliquidated at time of death) but no injury to
specific property 713 Such wrongs are clearly distinguishable
from personal injuries. It seems pretty clear that here was
another flaw in the common law.
In Maine the statute of 1840 added to the actions that sur-
vive, replevin, trover, assault and battery, trespass d. b. a., and
trespass on the case for damage done to real and personal prop-
erty. Under this statute it was held that an action did not
survive against a defendant who had caused a debtor to make
a fraudulent transfer of his property.59 But when later the
words "to real and personal property" were omitted from the
statute, it was held that an action for deceit would lie in favor
of a woman against the administrator of a man who purported
to but had not married her because he was not free to do so.
Here is a liberal construction, applying the statute to an
"action in case" for damages, which goes beyond the English
rule that n6 action for unliquidated damages would survive.
In Pennsylvania back in 1830, it was held that a cause of
action would survive in favor of a representative for a conspir-
acy to defraud the plaintiff under a liberal interpretation of the
Statute of 4 Edward III. The action was in case, and was held
to be a substitute for detinue if the property taken was still
held, and for the common count of money had and received if
the goods had been consumed.10 In New Jersey likewise, a stat-
ute providing for the survival of trespass to the person or prop-
erty was given a liberal construction (equals tort or wrong) and
was held to apply to a false representation whereby claimant
had been induced to buy certain mortgaged premises to his
pecuniary loss. 61 In Alabama in 1843 an action grounded on
uSee for example, discussion in 13 Cornell L. Quar. 596, 598.
S mith v. Estes, 46 Me. 158 (1858).
"Penrod v. Morrison, 2 P. & W. 126 (Pa. 1830). Under Pennsyl-
vania Statutes (1928), see. 8555, all actions survive save for those of
slander and libel.
"Tichenor v. Hayes, supra n. 28; see also Ten Eyckc v. Runk, supra
n. 39.
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fraud survived in favor of the representative but not against
him.62
In England it was held in the King's bench that where a
claimant had been fraudulently induced to enter a contract
under which he had paid out money, he could rescind and get
back the price if he could return what he had received; but if
the parties could not be placed in statu quo, the only action
would be one for deceit,63 which of course did not survive; and
subsequently it was held by the Chancellor in a similar trans-
action (claimant had bought worthless stock) that there could
be no recovery against the executor of the wrongdoer 64 where
the damages were unliquidated. But in England, a recovery
could be had under the liberal construction of the Statute of 4
Edward III where the damages were liquidated.65
In Massachusetts it has been held that an action will not
survive for falsely and fraudulently recommending the credit
of another;66 for the fraudulent sale of poisoned corn causing
the death of claimant's horses ;67 and for fraudulent representa-
tions inducing plaintiff to part with his land to his injury;6s
or against an attorney for subornation of perjury whereby
claimant's debtor avoided the payment of the claim.69 It is
probable that the Massachusetts rule in this respect agrees with
the English rule, since in all these cases the damages were un-
liquidated.
The rule in Illinois70 and in Michigan 7' (except as to fraud
and deceit by statute), in Washington 2 and in Wisconsin,73 is
"Coker v. Crozier, supra n. 32.
Clarke v. Dickson, El. El. & El. 148 (K. B. 1858).
Ten Eyck v. Runk, supra n. 39; In re Duncan (1899) 1 Ch. 387.
11 Twycross v. Grant, supra n. 32; see 1 Williams on Executors 609
(11th ed. 1921).
"Read v. Hatch, 19 Pick. 47 (1837).
61 Cutting v. Tower, 14 Gray 183 (Mass. 1859).
ILeggate v. Moulton, 115 Mass. 532 (1874).
"Jenks v. Hoag, 179 Mass. 583, 61 N. E. 221 (1901).
"0Jones v. Barmm, 217 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 505 (1905) (malicious
interference with claimant's business relations).
uDayton v. Fargo, 47 Mich. 153, 7 N. W. 758 (1881) (misrepre-
sentation of credit of a notemaker); Frolich v. Deacon, 181 Mich. 255,
148 N. W. 180, Ann. Cas. 19160, 722 (1914) (conspiracy in breach of
the Sherman Law cau-ing loss to the claimant).
73State v. Blake, supra n. 28 (fraudulent representations inducing
decedent to buy worthless stock).
, Lane v. Frawley, 102 Wis. 373, 78 N. W. 593 (1899) (fraud of an
attorney in procuring his client's note); Farwell v. Wolf, 96 Wis. 10,
70 N. W. 289 (1897) (conspiracy to defraud by purchasing goods from
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similar to that in Massachusetts, and is just about the common
law rule. In Rhode Island a conspiracy to prevent one from
enjoying the benefits of a fraternal order does not give rise to
a cause of action that survives, because it does not constitute
trespass or case for damages to person or property.74 It is not
clear however, that these courts base the reason upon the ground
that the claim is unliquidated. Claim in trover came to be re-
garded as covered by the statute of 4 Edward III, and under
the statute of 3 and 4 William IV similar causes should survive
against the representative. The Federal courts have held both
ways with respect to a cause of action arising from a breach of
the Sherman Anti-trust law.75 The case allowing a recovery has
been criticized. It is not so clear however, that the case is
wrong in result. The English courts have expanded the appli-
cation beyond that allowed by Mansfield.7 6 A liberal interpre-
tation of the term trespass to property might well include an
action in the nature of case for injury to one's business, but the
great weight of authority is against it.
To sum up: Contract actions survive both for and against
the representative. Obligations based upon final judgments not
appealed from, survive. Torts give rise to actions that sur-
vive where the action is based upon unjust enrichment. Actions
for breach of promise do not survive in any jurisdiction save
under an all embracing statute, and the policy of changing the
rule may well be doubtful. The action for breach of a physi-
cian's obligation to use due skill did not survive because it was
also regarded as essentially a tort action. There is a difference
in point of view whether a recovery could be had in contract
for incidental losses where the injury arose out of a contract.
A good many rulings both in England and America now allow
seller without paying for them. The New York statute was borrowed
by Wisconsin by way of Michigan).
Young v. AVlsworth, 35 R. I. 259, 86 A. 555 (1913).
T Caillouet v. American Sugar Refining Co., 250 Fed. 639 (D. C.
La. 1917) (holding no survival in favor of the representative and
declaring that the case is identical in principle with actions for fraud
and deceit); see discussion by Warren in 33 Har. L. Rev. 556, 570
(1920); Sullivan v. Assoc. Bill Posters, 6 Fed. 2nd 1000 (C. C. App.
1925) (holding that such action survives the death of defendant).
See comment thereon in 20 Ill. L. Rev. 716 (1926) by Professor Wood-
ward.7*Cf. Williams supra note.
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an action to survive for damages from tort where there is also a
breach of contract.
The cause of action based upon the obligation of an attor-
ney to use due skill, and other obligations somewhat similar,
survived unless the only injury was personal. Such wrongi
generally affected the "personal estate of the claimant whereby
it became less beneficial' 77 but were unliquidated and were not
damages to specific property. The action survived as being
based on a breach of contract.
Ever since the Statute of 4 Edward III, there has been
constant statutory progress toward increasing the types of
actions that survive. What that progress has been, and the
dilemma the courts now find themselves in, will be examined in
a subsequent paper.
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